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Contracts Formed Under the Indian
Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act
are as Binding as Any Other Government
Agreements with a Contractor:
Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma v. Leavitt
GOVERNMENTS - NATIVE AMERICANS - INDIAN SELF-
DETERMINATION AND EDUCATION ASSISTANCE ACT - The Supreme
Court of the United States held that "self-determination" contracts
between the Federal Government and Native American tribes are
as binding on the Federal Government as any other contractor
agreement.
Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma v. Leavitt, 543 U.S. 631 (2005).
In 1975, Congress enacted the Indian Self-Determination and
Education Assistance Act (hereinafter "ISDA") in order to
strengthen collaborative relationships with Native American
tribes.1 The ISDA, as amended, allowed Native American tribes to
contract with the federal government; under these contracts, the
tribes themselves, rather than a federal agency, would provide
health services to their members.2 In return, the government
agreed to reimburse the tribes for "administrative expenses" in-
curred in the provision of these services.3 Under the ISDA, admin-
istrative expenses include "contract support costs," which are rea-
sonable costs that a federal agency would not have incurred, but
1. 25 U.S.C. § 450a(b) (2005). In passing the Act, Congress declared:
[Our] commitment to the maintenance of the Federal Government's unique and
continuing relationship with, and responsibility to, individual Indian tribes and
to the Indian people as a whole through the establishment of a meaningful In-
dian self-determination policy which will permit an orderly transition from the
Federal domination of programs for, and services to, Indians to effective and
meaningful participation by the Indian people in the planning, conduct, and
administration of those programs and services. In accordance with this policy,
the United States is committed to supporting and assisting Indian tribes in the
development of strong and stable tribal governments, capable of administering
quality programs and developing the economies of their respective communi-
ties.
Id.
2. Cherokee Nation v. Leavitt, 543 U.S. 631, 634 (2005). See also 25 U.S.C. § 450f(a).
3. Cherokee Nation, 543 U.S. at 634. See also 25 U.S.C. § 450f(a).
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the tribes, as contractors, would incur in order to ensure compli-
ance with the contract.
4
Petitioners Cherokee Nation of Okalahoma and Shoshone-
Pauite Tribes of the Duck Valley Reservation (collectively herein-
after "Tribes") entered into multiple contracts with the Federal
Government (hereinafter "Government"), under the ISDA, to pro-
vide services previously supplied by the U.S. Indian Health Ser-
vice.5 In each agreement, the Government promised to pay con-
tract support costs, but later refused to pay the full amount on the
grounds it had not received sufficient funds from Congress.6 The
Tribes pursued their claims through two separate cases, which
were subsequently consolidated by the United States Supreme
Court.
7
In the first case, Cherokee Nation submitted contract claims for
fiscal year 1997, and the Shoshone-Pauites, for fiscal years 1996
and 1997.8 They submitted these claims to the Department of the
Interior (hereinafter "Department"), which was responsible for the
relevant appropriations. 9 When the Department refused to pay,
the Tribes brought an action for breach of contract in the Federal
District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma, seeking a to-
tal of $6.9 million in damages." The district court found for the
Government, and the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit af-
firmed."
In the second case, Cherokee Nation submitted claims for fiscal
years 1994, 1995, and 1996.12 The denial of these claims by the
Department was reversed by the Board of Contract Appeals,
which ordered the Government to pay $8.5 million in damages."
The Government appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit, which affirmed the Board's decision in favor of the Tribe.
4. Cherokee Nation, 543 U.S. at 635. See also 25 U.S.C. § 450j.
5. Cherokee Nation, 543 U.S. at 635.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 635-36.
8. Id. at 635. The contracts were for tribal administration of community health pro-
grams, including the 15 bed Owyhee Community Health Facility. Cherokee Nation of
Oklahoma v. United States, 190 F. Supp. 2d 1248, 1252 (D. Okla. 2001).
9. Cherokee Nation, 543 U.S. at 635.
10. Id. at 636.
11. Id.
12. Id. The contracts were for the tribal administration of "hospitals, health clinics,
dental services, mental health programs, and alcohol and substance abuse programs, all of
which were formerly operated by [the Federal Government]." Thompson v. Cherokee Na-
tion, 334 F.3d 1075, 1081 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
13. Cherokee Nation, 543 U.S. at 636.
14. Id.
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The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari and
consolidated the cases in order to settle the difference between the
circuits.15
Justice Breyer wrote the majority opinion. 6 He began by pre-
senting a series of facts asserted by the Tribes and not denied by
the Government:' The Government did promise to pay, then failed
to pay, the costs at issue. 8 If the contracts at issue had been
standard procurement contracts, 19 they would have been legally
binding." Congress annually appropriated between $1.277 billion
and $1.419 billion to the Indian Health Service to execute the In-
dian Self-Determination Act.21 These amounts far exceeded the
amounts at issue in these cases.22 The congressional appropria-
tions were in lump-sum amounts, without any statutory restric-
tions applicable to these claims (no "spending cap").23 In the case
of normal procurement contracts, when Congress appropriates
sufficient funds to pay contracts at issue as part of a lump-sum
appropriation, the Government is legally bound to pay those
claims.24 The Government may not invalidate such contracts
merely by contracting for a total amount greater than the appro-
priation, even if the contracts at issue contain a "subject to the
availability of appropriations" clause.25
15. Id.
16. Id. Justice Breyer was joined by Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter,
Thomas, and Ginsburg. Id. at 633. Justice Scalia wrote a concurring opinion. Id. Chief
Justice Rehnquist took no part in the decisions. Id.
17. Cherokee Nation, 543 U.S. at 636-37.
18. Id. at 636.
19. Procurement contracts are:
the legal instrument reflecting a relationship between the United States Gov-
ernment and a State, a local government, or other recipient [to be used] when
(1) the principal purpose of the instrument is to acquire (by purchase, lease, or
barter) property or services for the direct benefit or use of the United States
Government; or (2) the agency decides in a specific instance that the use of a
procurement contract is appropriate.
31 U.S.C. § 6303 (2002).
20. Cherokee Nation, 543 U.S. at 636.
21. Id. at 637. See also 107 Stat. 1408 (1993); 108 Stat. 2527-2528 (1994); 110 Stat.
1321 (1996).
22. Cherokee Nation, 543 U.S. at 637.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. See, for example, the case of Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182 (1993), where the
U.S. Supreme Court defined a fundamental principle of appropriations law: Where "Con-
gress merely appropriates lump-sum amounts without [statutory restrictions], a clear in-
ference arises that it does not intend to impose legally binding restrictions, and indicia in
committee reports and other legislative history as to how the funds should or are expected
to be spent do not establish [additional] legal requirements." Lincoln, 508 U.S. at 192
(quoting In re LTV Aerospace Corp., 55 Comp.Gen. 307, 319 (1975)).
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The Court then reasoned that if the Government denied none of
these facts, it must demonstrate that the contracts at issue were
somehow different from standard procurement contracts in order
to prevail.2' The majority examined and rejected the Govern-
ment's argument that contracts created under the ISDA are a
"unique, government-to-government" type of "self-determination
contract" differing from "standard government procurement con-
tracts."27 The Government argued that because the Tribes take
the place of Government agencies in providing services under the
ISDA, and because the Tribes have mutual self-awareness of the
various contracts, they should be treated under the law as another
government agency rather than as a contractor.28 The Govern-
ment further argued that this quasi-agency status would require
the tribes to bear the risk of not being paid if the congressional
appropriation is insufficient to cover all of the Government's con-
tracts pursuant to execution of the ISDA.29 The Government at-
tempted to support its argument with two quotes from the ISDA:
"no [self-determination] contract .. .shall be construed to be a
procurement contract" and "[a tribe need not deliver services] in
excess of the amount of funds awarded.""
The Court rejected this argument because, as Justice Breyer
explained, the language of the ISDA read as a whole strongly sug-
gested that Congress intended contracts made under the ISDA to
be as binding as any other Government contractual promise."
Justice Breyer then pointed out that the ISDA uses the word "con-
tract" 426 times to describe the nature of the agreement between
the Government and the Tribes, with no language to indicate that
the word "contract" as used in the ISDA means anything other
than its normal legal definition.32 The majority also noted a spe-
cific clause in the ISDA entitling contractors to "money damages"
26. Cherokee Nation, 543 U.S. at 638.
27. Id. (quoting from Brief for Federal Parties at 4, Cherokee Nation v. Leavitt, 543
U.S. 631 (2005) (Nos. 02-1472, 03-853)).
28. Cherokee Nation, 543 U.S. at 638.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 638-39 (citing Brief for Federal Parties, supra note 27, at 24 (quoting 25
U.S.C. § 450b(j) and 25 U.S.C. § 4501(c) (2005))).
31. Cherokee Nation, 543 U.S. at 639.
32. Id. "[The word 'contract' normally refers to 'a promise or a set of promises for the
breach of which the law gives a remedy, or the performance of which the law in some way
recognizes a duty.'" Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (1981)).
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under the Contracts Dispute Act if the Government refuses to
33pay.
In response to the selected ISDA excerpts cited by the Govern-
ment in support of its position, the Court recognized that the
overall purpose of the ISDA was to promote greater self-reliance
among Native American tribes, in part by remedying past Gov-
ernmental failures to reimburse the Tribes for legitimate adminis-
trative costs. 34 Justice Breyer further explained that the Govern-
ment's specific quotes did not actually support its argument be-
cause the language indicating that the tribes need not deliver ser-
vices "in excess of the amount of funds awarded" is a clause often
used in standard government procurement contracts.35 Further-
more, the majority held that the ISDA's provision that self-
determination contracts are not to be construed as procurement
contracts merely means that self-determination contracts are not
subject to some technical reporting requirements of standard pro-
curement contracts; it does not mean that self-determination con-
tracts are less legally binding.3 Finally, the Coiirt stated it found
no evidence that Congress supported the Government's argument
that the Tribes, rather than the Government, should bear the risk
if Congress should approve a lump-sum insufficient to pay all the
Government's contracts.
Having determined that the contracts at issue were no different
from normal government procurement contracts, the majority
then applied this designation as it addressed the Government's
33. Cherokee Nation, 543 U.S. at 639. The Contract Disputes Act ("CDA") includes a
set of "comprehensive procedures [which] govern the resolution of contract disputes that
arise between the government and contractors. The CDA was intended primarily to create
opportunities for informal dispute resolution at the contracting officer level and to provide
contractors with clear notice as to the government's position regarding contract claims." 64
AM. JUR. 2D Public Works and Contracts § 206 (2005).
34. Cherokee Nation, 543 U.S. at 639. (citing 25 U.S.C. § 450a(b) and 25 U.S.C. § 450j-
1). 25 U.S.C. §450j-i(d)(2) states: "Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to author-
ize the Secretary to fund less than the full amount of need for indirect costs associated with
a self-determination contract."
35. Cherokee Nation, 543 U.S. at 639-40 (citing W. KEYES, GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS
UNDER THE FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATION § 32.38, p. 724 (3d ed. 2003)).
36. Cherokee Nation, 543 U.S. at 640.
37. Id. The government had argued that, just as a federal agency has no legal right to
receive the amount promised by Congress, neither should the Tribes since, by providing
services in place of a Federal agency, they had elected to "ste[p] into the shoes of a federal
agency." Id. at 638 (quoting from Brief for Federal Parties at 25, Cherokee Nation v.
Leavitt, 543 U.S. 631 (2005)). See also Ferris v. United States, 27 Ct. Cl. 542, 546 (1892)
("A contractor who is one of several persons to be paid out of an appropriation is not
chargeable with knowledge of its administration, nor can his legal rights be affected or
impaired by its diversion, whether legal or illegal, to other objects.").
403Winter 2006
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remaining arguments.3' The Court began by considering and re-
jecting the Government's dual arguments that its promises were
statutorily nonbinding under two provisions in the ISDA, the "Ap-
propriations Clause" and the "Reduction Clause."
39
First, Justice Breyer noted that the congressional appropria-
tions under the ISDA for the relevant years did contain sufficient
unrestricted funds to pay the claims at issue.40 The Government's
argument that those unrestricted funds were used to pay other
expenses41 incurred by the Government was dismissed as irrele-
vant by the majority.42 Justice Breyer pointed out that even a
critical alternative need for the funds is insufficient to release the
Government from binding contractual promises, absent some spe-
cial statutory provision.43 The Court then reasoned that if the
Government intentionally breaches a contract" in order to accom-
plish some more important objective, the injured contractor is
then free to pursue appropriate legal remedies.45
Second, the Court rejected the Government's attempt to bolster
its position with a proviso in the ISDA that stated the Govern-
ment's provision of funds is "subject to the availability of appro-
priations."46 Justice Breyer explained that this type of language is
common in Government contracts and normally means that those
contracts, if negotiated in advance of the fiscal year, are not bind-
ing until Congress actually appropriates the funds, which it did in
each of the years relevant to this case.47 Emphasizing the impor-
38. Cherokee Nation, 543 U.S. at 640-44.
39. Id. at 640-41. "The amount of funds required by subsection (a)-- (1) shall not be
reduced to make funding available for contract monitoring or administration by the Secre-
tary; [and] (2) shall not be reduced by the Secretary in subsequent years .... ." 25 U.S.C.
§ 450j-1(b).
40. Cherokee Nation, 543 U.S. at 641.
41. At least some of the funds were used for the running of the Indian Health Service's
central Washington office. Id. at 641-42.
42. Id. at 642.
43. Id. The Court also found irrelevant the Government's citation of statutory lan-
guage forbidding the Government to contract for certain types of services because the pro-
vision cited had nothing to do with the source of funds for legitimately contracted activities,
which was the issue in this case. Id.
44. Id. The Court expressed its belief that the Government should attempt to avoid
breaching contracts by "refraining from making less essential contractual commitments; or
by asking Congress in advance to protect funds needed for the more essential purposes with
statutory earmarks; or by seeking additional funding from Congress ...." Id.
45. Cherokee Nation, 543 U.S. at 642.
46. Id. (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 450j-1(b)(2005)).
47. Cherokee Nation, 543 U.S. at 643.
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tance of providing a consistent interpretation 48 of similar provi-
sions in comparable federal statutes, the Court found that the
Government failed to meet its burden of showing why this proviso
should be given any other interpretation than the standard one
applied by the majority.49
Finally, the Court examined and rejected the Government's
third argument, that its position was supported by a later-enacted
statute, § 314 of the 1999 Appropriations Act. ° The majority
opined that this statutory language is open to two interpreta-
tions.5 First, the language cited could be read as retroactively
barring all payment of claims arising out of contracts for the years
1994-1997.52 The Court rejected this interpretation because it
would undo binding governmental contractual promises, possibly
in violation of the Constitution.53  Alternatively, the provision
could be read as prohibiting the payment of those claims only by
unspent funds appropriated in prior years." The Court chose this
interpretation as best reflecting Congress' intent, especially in
light of contemporaneous actions by the Executive Branch.5 The
Court flatly rejected a third interpretation, urged by the Govern-
ment, that the statute should be read as clarifying earlier ambigu-
ous appropriations language that was wrongly read as unre-
stricted, because the Court did not find the earlier statute to be
ambiguous; rather, the Court found the statute clearly provided
unrestricted lump-sum appropriations.56
48. Id. at 644. The majority expressed a concern that inconsistent interpretation would
"undermine contractors' confidence that they will be paid, and in turn increase the cost to
the Government of purchasing goods and services." Id.
49. Id. Justice Breyer specifically noted that the legislative history cited by the Gov-
ernment established only that the Executive Branch wanted discretionary authority to
allocate lump-sum appropriations insufficient to cover all its contracts, not that Congress
every granted such authority. Id.
50. Id. at 645-46. The provision at issue read, "Notwithstanding any other provision of
law... [the] amounts appropriated to or earmarked in committee reports for the... Indian
Health Service ... [for] payments to tribes ... for contract support costs ... are the total
amounts available for fiscal years 1994 through 1998 for such purposes." Appropriations
Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, §314, 112 Stat. 2681 (1998).
51. Cherokee Nation, 543 U.S. at 645.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 646.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 645-46. The majority referred to (1) a ruling by the Interior Department's
Board of Contract Appeals in In re Alamo Navajo School Board and Miccosukee Corp., 98-2
B.C.A. P29, 831 (Dep't of Interior Dec. 4, 1997) that the Government was legally bound by
contracts similar to those in this case and (2) an Indian Health Service draft document
suggesting the possibility of using surplus funds from 1994-1997 to pay contract support
costs. Id.
56. Cherokee Nation, 543 U.S. at 646-47.
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Having determined that the contracts at issue, formed under
the ISDA between the Tribes and the Government, were as bind-
ing as standard government procurement contracts, the Court af-
firmed the Federal Circuit's judgment in favor of the Cherokee
Nation, reversed the Tenth Circuit's judgment in favor of the Gov-
ernment, and remanded both cases for further proceedings consis-
tent with this opinion.5"
In his brief concurring opinion, Justice Scalia stated that he
agreed with the entire majority opinion except for its reliance on a
senate committee report as a tool for statutory interpretation.58
Justice Scalia asserted that a congressional committee report,
which was written by staff members and may never have been
read by more than a few congressmen, cannot be said to express
the intent of the United States Congress.59
The most basic principle of contract law is that promises ought
to be kept." A contract is a promise to do something in the future,
a promise made binding by the power of the law.6 When one
party breaches a contract, whether by non-performance or repu-
diation, the nonbreaching party may claim damages. 2
In the 1892 case of Ferris v. United States,' the United States
Court of Claims held that nonpayment of a contract by the Federal
Government is such a breach of contract, for which the court may
order the payment of damages as a remedy to the nonbreaching
party.64 The United States Army hired Ferris to dredge a channel
of the Delaware River, delayed his work by several months, and
then ordered him to stop before the project was complete.6" The
Army refused to pay Ferris the full amount of the contract on the
57. Id. at 636.
58. Id. at 647 (Scalia, J., concurring in part). The majority cited S. Rep. No. 100-274, at
7 (1987) (explaining the decision not to submit tribal contracts to procurement rules in
order to reduce "excessive paperwork and unduly burdensome reporting requirements.").
Id. at 640 (majority opinion).
59. Id. at 647 (Scalia, J., concurring in part).
60. JOHN E. MURRAY, JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACTS § 1 (2001) (quoting S. PUFENDORF,
DE JURE NATURAE ET GENTIUM, Bk. III, ch. IV, § 2: "pacta sunt servanda") ("It is, there-
fore, a most sacred precept of natural law, and one that governs the grace, manner and
reasonableness of all human life, that every man keep his given word, that is, carry out his
promises and agreements.") In the same section, Pufendorf quoted ARISTOTLE, RHETORIC,
Bk. I, ch. XV(22): "If contracts are invalidated, the intercourse of men is abolished."
MURRAY, supra, at § 1.
61. MURRAY, supra note 60, at § 2.
62. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 236 (1981).
63. 27 Ct. Cl. 542 (1892).
64. Ferris, 27 Ct. Cl. 542.
65. Id.
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grounds that the appropriation which covered the project had been
exhausted.66  The court, however, held that exhaustion of an ap-
propriation did not relieve the government of its contractual obli-
gation to Ferris.67
However, the United States Supreme Court subsequently held
that the government's contractual obligation is limited by the
amount of the appropriation in Sutton v. United States." As in
Ferris, a dredging company, represented by Sutton, was hired for
a federal dredging project. 9 The government supervisor oversee-
ing the project allotted some of the appropriation to the contrac-
tors and some to his own office expenses. ° When the government
supervisor erred and ordered more dredging than the appropria-
tion would cover, the government refused to pay the dredging
company." The Sutton Court held that no agent of the govern-
ment has the authority, express or implied, to contract for goods or
services in excess of the amount of the appropriation.72 The Court
also decided that individuals contracting with the government are
held to have notice of the total amount that has been appropri-
ated.73 Nevertheless, those contractors are entitled to payment to
the full extent of the available appropriation, including any
amount the government has reserved for its own use."
66. Id.
67. Id. at 546 (citing Dougherty's Case, 18 Ct. Cl. 496 (1883)). The court in Dougherty
stated:
A contractor who is one of several persons to be paid out of an appropriation is
not chargeable with knowledge of its administration, nor can his legal rights be
affected or impaired by its maladministration or by its diversion, whether legal
or illegal, to other objects. An appropriation per se merely imposes limitations
upon the Government's own agents; it is a definite amount of money entrusted
to them for distribution; but its insufficiency does not pay the Government's
debts, nor cancel its obligations, nor defeat the rights of other parties.
Id.
68. Sutton v. United States, 256 U.S. 575 (1921).
69. Sutton, 256 U.S. at 577. Sutton was a bankruptcy trustee for Hillsboro Dredging
Company. Id. at 578.
70. Id. at 581. The amount appropriated was $23,000. Id. The Government originally
paid the contractor only $21,267 and reserved the remaining $1,733 for office expenses. Id.
71. Id. 581. The contractor claimed an additional $4594. Id. at 578
72. Id. at 579.
73. Id.
74. Sutton, 256 U.S. at 581. The Sutton Court held
if, through mistake of the Government's representatives more work is done,
and work is continued for a longer period than was contracted for or author-
ized, . . . the contractor should not be made to suffer by the depletion of the ap-
propriation. The fund otherwise available for work actually performed should
be applied to that purpose.
407
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The United States Court of Claims distinguished New York
Airways v. United States75 from Sutton by emphasizing the limit-
ing language of both the Sutton contract and the statute under
which the dredging funds were appropriated.6 In contrast, the
New York Airways contracts with the Civil Aeronautics Board
were created under a statute that expressly required the carriers
to transport the United States mail whenever requested by the
Postmaster General and promised compensation in return." The
Court held that where the contractual obligation is part of the
statutory language, contracts made under that statute create an
obligation in the federal government which is not relieved merely
by Congress' failure to appropriate sufficient funds, unless Con-
gress also clearly modifies or repeals the statute as well.7 s
The rights of individual contractors vis-&-vis the federal gov-
ernment were strengthened further in Blackhawk Heating &
Plumbing Co. v. United States.79 In 1967, the Veteran's Admini-
stration signed a fixed-price contract with Blackhawk and its
partner company for the construction of a hospital." After the
hospital was completed, the government and Blackhawk renegoti-
ated the final settlement price of ten million dollars in an agree-
ment that contained a contingency clause. 1 The government told
Blackhawk that funds for this final payment would be shifted
from other Veteran's Administration projects, through a "repro-
gramming" of funds, which meant Blackhawk would have to wait
75. 369 F.2d 743 (Ct. Cl. 1966).
76. New York Airways, 369 F.2d 748. The court held that:
Where, however, a construction contract expressly provided that the quantities
of work ordered shall be kept "within the limits of available funds," and a stat-
ute prohibited obligating the Government to pay a larger sum than covered by
a specific appropriation, extra work ordered and performed in excess of the ap-
propriation was held not to create an obligation against the Government en-
forceable in the courts.
Id. at 749.
77. Id. at 745 & n.1 (citing the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 § 401(1), 49 U.S.C. § 1371
(1958): "Whenever so authorized by its certificate, any air carrier shall provide necessary
and adequate facilities and service for the transportation of mail, and shall transport mail
whenever required by the Postmaster General. Such air carrier shall be entitled to receive
reasonable compensation therefore as hereinafter provided.").
78. New York Airways, 369 F.2d at 748 (citing United States v. Vulte, 233 U.S. 509
(1914)). "It has long been established that mere failure of Congress to appropriate funds,
without further words modifying or repealing, expressly or by clear implication, the sub-
stantive law, does not in and of itself defeat a Gvernment obligation created by statute."
New York Airways, 369 F.2d at 748.
79. 622 F.2d 539 (Ct. Cl. 1980).
80. Blackhawk, 622 F.2d at 541.
81. Id. at 541-42.
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until the completion of the reprogramming for the funds to be
available.' After the settlement agreement was signed, the sen-
ate subcommittee overseeing the Veteran's Administration issued
a report suggesting that the Administration's settlement authority
should be limited to six million dollars." The Veteran's Admini-
stration limited its payment to Blackhawk to six million dollars,
but Blackhawk eventually sued and received an additional two
million.'
In explaining its decision in Blackhawk, the United States
Court of Claims noted that mere congressional disapproval, as
expressed in a committee report, is not an affirmative congres-
sional action. 5 The court then held that the Veterans Administra-
tion's need to reprogram funding streams did not entitle it to in-
voke the contingency clause so long as funds were available from
the overall appropriation.86 The right to payment vested in the
contractor when sufficient appropriated funds were available at
the time the payment was due, a right that could not be divested
by subsequent legislative action.87
One issue raised in Blackhawk, the issue of federal agency dis-
cretion in the face of congressional disapproval, appeared again in
Lincoln v. Vigil," which was argued before the United States Su-
preme Court in 1993.89 When the Federal Indian Health Service
discontinued a program serving handicapped Southwest Indian
children in favor of a national program, members of the Southwest
tribes sought an injunction to preserve their program." The Su-
preme Court reasoned that the Service's decision was not subject
to judicial review based on the principle that allocation of lump
sum appropriations is legally committed to the discretion of the
agency.91 The majority held this to be true even if the legislative
82. Id. at 542. The specific language in the contract read: "The Government's obliga-
tion hereunder is contingent upon the availability of appropriated funds from which pay-
ment in full can be made." Id. The Government negotiator repeatedly told the contractor
that the funds were available. Id. at 542-43.
83. Id. at 544-45.
84. Id. at 546. The court held that the government's failure to pay final two million
dollar payment was not actionable because Congress prohibited that payment by affirma-
tive action before the final payment was due. Id. at 553.
85. Blackhawk, 622 F.2d at 552.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 553.
88. 508 U.S. 182 (1993).
89. Lincoln, 508 U.S. at 184.
90. Id. at 189.
91. Id. at 184.
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history of the appropriations statute, but not the statute itself,
contained language indicating how Congress expected the funds to
be spent."
A second issue from Blackhawk, whether the government may
retroactively repudiate its obligation, reappeared in 1996 in
United States v. Winstar Corporation." Winstar involved three
financial institutions (hereafter "thrifts") that brought suit against
the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (hereafter "Board") for breach
of contract and constitutional claims based on the Financial Insti-
tutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (hereafter
"FIRREA). " Prior to FIRREA, the thrifts had signed contracts
with the Board, agreeing to take on "supervisory" roles with fail-
ing financial institutions.95 In return, the Board promised the
thrifts they would be allowed to count good will and capital credits
as part of their required capital reserves." After this accounting
practice was disallowed by the passage of FIRREA, the thrifts
were negatively impacted by their failure to maintain their re-
quired capital.97 Subsequently, the thrifts brought suit against the
government for breach of contract.
98
The United States Supreme Court read the contracts as an
agreement by the government to assume the risk of insuring the
thrifts against losses arising from future changes in the regula-
tions, the exact situation created by FIRREA.99 Under this read-
ing, the majority held, the contracts at issue did not restrict Con-
gress's future regulatory authority but the contracts did assign to
the government the risk of any resulting harm sustained by the
thrifts as a result of Congress' actions. 1° The Court refused to
construe the FIRREA statute as abrogating the government's con-
92. Id. at 191. The majority stated:
[A] fundamental principle of appropriations law that where "Congress merely
appropriates lump-sum amounts without statutorily restricting what can be
done with those funds, a clear inference arises that it does not intend to impose
legally binding restrictions, and indicia in committee reports and other legisla-
tive history as to how the funds should or are expected to be spent do not estab-
lish any legal requirements on" the agency.
Id. at 192.
93. 518 U.S. 839 (1996).
94. Winstar, 518 U.S. at 843.
95. Id. at 847-48.
96. Id. at 848-49.
97. Id. at 857-58. Thrifts which could not maintain the required capital were subject to
seizure by thrift regulators. Id.
98. Id. at 839.
99. Winstar, 518 U.S. at 843.
100. Id. at 871.
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tractual obligations to the thrifts. T10  Furthermore, the Court
pointed out that the government's attempt to shift the unexpected
costs to its contractual partners was actually against the govern-
ment's own long-term interest because it would undermine the
government's credibility with future contractors, ultimately result-
ing in increased costs to the government.
10 2
The United States Supreme Court later applied the Winstar
doctrine in interpreting the Indian Self-Determination and Educa-
tion Assistance Act, which formed the statutory backdrop for
Cherokee Nation v. Leavitt."3 ISDA outlines circumstances under
which the tribes may choose to contract with the federal govern-
ment.' Passed in 1975, ISDA was designed to encourage tribes to
achieve greater self-determination in the areas of education and
health services.' Tribes could elect to contract with the federal
government to provide their own services in exchange for pay-
ments from either the Department of Health, Education and Wel-
fare or the Department of the Interior."6
Unfortunately for the tribes, the United States Claims Court
held, in Busby v. United States,1 7 that contracts formed under the
ISDA were not subject to the provisions of the Contract Disputes
Act, thus denying the tribes access to a federal contract dispute
resolution process available to other government contractors."8 In
Busby, the Northern Cheyenne Indian Tribe brought suit against
the federal government for the government's failure to repair a
tribal school."' The tribe had an ISDA self-determination contract
101. Id. at 875.
102. Id. at 883-84.
103. Cherokee Nation, 543 U.S. at 644.
104. 25 U.S.C. §§ 450-450m-1 (2005).
105. Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 93-638, 88
Stat. 2203 (1975). The stated purposes of the Act were:
to provide maximum Indian participation in the Government and education of
the Indian people; to provide for the full participation of Indian tribes in pro-
grams and services conducted by the Federal Government for Indians and to
encourage the development of human resources of the Indian people; to estab-
lish a program of assistance to upgrade Indian education; to support the right




107. 8 Cl. Ct. 596 (1985).
108. Busby, 8 Cl. Ct. at 598. "Where a federal contract contains a disputes clause that is
not governed by the CDA, and also provides a specific administrative remedy for a particu-
lar dispute, the contractor must exhaust its administrative contractual remedies prior to
seeking judicial relief." 64 AM. JUR. 2D Public Works and Contracts § 206 (2005).
109. Busby, 8 Cl. Ct. at 596.
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to administer the school, but the government retained the respon-
sibility for maintaining and repairing the school building." The
government neglected to perform necessary repairs for over a dec-
ade, until the building became uninhabitable and the State of
Montana put the school's accreditation on probation."'
However, when the tribe brought suit, the Claims Court ren-
dered summary judgment for the government." 2 First, the court
noted that not all contracts fall within the Contracts Dispute
Act." 3 The majority then reasoned that, because the tribal self-
determination contracts were not "procurement" contracts, they
fell outside the regulations generally governing contracts between
the government and private contractors."
4
Busby remained law for three years, until it was overturned by
congressional statute in the 1988 Amendment to the ISDA."5
Congress added a section on contract appeals, specifring that the
Tribes could bring suit against the government for breach of con-
tracts created under the ISDA."6 At the same time, Congress af-
110. Id. at 600. The contract actually prohibited the tribe from using contractual funds
to repair the school themselves without the Government's express approval. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 599. In support of this position, the Court cited Coastal Corp. v. United
States, 713 F.2d 728, 730 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (an "implied contract, which defines the way the
government must deal with bids in the process of selecting a contractor, is not a contract
[subject to the Contracts Dispute Act]") and Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v.
United States, 7 Cl. Ct. 549, 552-54 (1985) (which held that a "subsidy contract" between
the U.S. Merchant Marine and a shipbuilder was not subject to the Contract Dispute Act).
114. Busby, 8 Cl. Ct. at 600. The Court defined the tribal contracts as being "basically
grant or sociological type contracts designed to accomplish government social policy goals."
Id.
115. Pub. L. No. 100-472, 102 Stat. 2285 (1988).
116. 25 U.S.C. § 450m-l(a) (2005). The statute reads:
The United States district courts shall have original jurisdiction over any civil
action or claim against the appropriate Secretary arising under this Act and,
subject to the provisions of subsection (d) of this section and concurrent with
the United States Court of Claims, over any civil action or claim against the
Secretary for money damages arising under contracts authorized by this Act. In
an action brought under this paragraph, the district courts may order appro-
priate relief including money damages, injunctive relief against any action by
an officer of the United States or any agency thereof contrary to this Act or
regulations promulgated thereunder, or mandamus to compel an officer or em-
ployee of the United States, or any agency thereof, to perform a duty provided
under this Act or regulations promulgated hereunder (including immediate in-
junctive relief to reverse a declination finding under section 102(a)(2) [25 USCS
§ 450f(a)(2)] or to compel the Secretary to award and fund an approved self-
determination contract).
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firmed that these contracts were not subject to the same require-
ments as procurement contracts.
117
In another section of the 1988 amendment, Congress specified
that the amount of funds paid under a self-determination contract
must not be less than the government would have spent adminis-
tering the same health services program, plus the amount of con-
tract support costs."' The statute went on to define contract sup-
port costs as reasonable costs for activities undertaken by the
Tribes in order to comply with the contract, even if the Tribes had
to engage in activities beyond those that would be needed by the
government in providing the same services." 9
In 1997, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Cir-
cuit found that the government had violated the support costs
provision of the ISDA in Ramah Navajo Chapter v. Lujan. 2 °
Ramah Navajo Chapter, a Navajo Nation organization, had five
self-determination contracts with the United States Department
of the Interior and two contracts with the State of New Mexico,
funded by the United States Department of Justice. 2' Ramah and
the government disagreed over the correct formula for determin-
ing the Chapter's contract support costs.122 The Tenth Circuit held
that the Department of Justice funds could not be included in the
direct cost base because doing so would deprive the tribe of full
indirect cost reimbursement. 23 In interpreting the 1988 Amend-
ment to the ISDA, the Court noted that any ambiguity in federal
117. 25 U.S.C. § 450e-1 (2005).
118. Id. § 450j-1(a)(1). See also S. REP. NO. 100-274, at 8-13 (1987), which notes "the
single most serious problem with the implementation of the Indian self-determination
policy has been the failure... to provide funding for the indirect costs associated with self-
determination contracts."
119. 25 U.S.C. § 450j-1(a)(2) (2005). Specifically, the statute says:
There shall be added [to the amount paid for services equaling what the Gov-
erment would have spent] contract support costs which shall consist of an
amount for the reasonable costs for activities which must be carried on by a
tribal organization as a contractor to ensure compliance with the terms of the
contract and prudent management, but which (A) normally are not carried on
by the respective Secretary in his direct operation of the program; or (B) are
provided by the Secretary in support of the contracted program from resources
other than those under contract.
Id.
120. 112 F.3d 1455 (10th Cir. 1997).
121. Ramah, 112 F.3d at 1458-59.
122. Id. at 1460.
123. Id. at 1463. "By Including the Department of Justice funds in the direct costs base,
defendants effectively and knowingly reduced the amount of funding they would provide to
[the Tribe] to cover the indirect costs pool and thereby deprived [the Tribe] of full indirect
costs funding for fiscal year 1989." Id.
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statutes involving Native Americans is to be interpreted to the
benefit of the tribes. The majority further reasoned that, in light
of the ISDA's purpose of encouraging self-determination, Congress
could not have intended the 1988 Amendment to maintain the
status quo of underfunding tribal contract support costs.
However, in addition to requiring government payment of tribal
contract support costs, the 1988 amendment also contained lan-
guage limiting the reimbursement funds available to the amount
appropriated by Congress. 12' This provision gave rise to the litiga-
tion in Babbit v. Oglala Sioux Tribal Public Safety Department.
127
For fiscal. year 1995, the congressional appropriation for ISDA
contracts included a provision expressly limiting the amount allot-
ted for contract support costs to $95,823,000, which only allowed
the government to reimburse 91.74% of the tribe's support costs.
128
The Oglala Sioux Tribal Public Safety Department sued the De-
partment of the Interior for their remaining $108,506 in negoti-
ated contract support costs. 129 The Oglala Sioux argued that the
overarching purpose of the ISDA trumped the limiting provision of
the statute.130 The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit dis-
agreed, stating that the express language of the statute was un-
ambiguous and thus could not be interpreted in favor of the
Sioux." ' The majority in Oglala Sioux distinguished the case from
New York Airways on the grounds that the appropriation statute
in Oglala Sioux contained language expressly limiting the amount
124. Id. at 1461. The Ramah court explained:
[While] we typically defer to the administering agencies interpretation [of an
ambiguous statute] as long as it is based on a permissible construction of the
statute at issue... [We] have held that federal statutes are to be construed lib-
erally in favor of Native Americans, with ambiguous provisions interpreted to
their benefit.
Id. See also Muscogee (Creek) Nation v. Hodel, 851 F.2d 1439, 1445 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (hold-
ing that "if the [Act] can reasonably be construed as the Tribe would have it construed it
must be construed that way.").
125. Ramah, 112 F.3d at 1462.
126. 25 U.S.C. § 450j-1 (2005). "Notwithstanding any other provision in this Act, the
provision of funds under this Act is subject to the availability of appropriations and the
Secretary is not required to reduce funding for programs, projects, or activities serving a
tribe to make funds available to another tribe or tribal organization under this Act." Id.
127. 194 F.3d 1374, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
128. Oglala Sioux, 194 F.3d at 1376.
129. Id. at 1377.
130. Id. at 1378.
131. Id. at 1378-79. See also South Carolina v. Catawba Indian Tribe, Inc., 476 U.S.
498, 505-06 (1986) (stating, "The canon of construction regarding the resolution of ambigui-
ties in favor of Indians, however, does not permit reliance on ambiguities that do not exist;
nor does it permit disregard of the clearly expressed intent of Congress.").
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available for support costs, while New York Airways appropriation
was simply insufficient to pay the government's previously con-
tracted unqualified obligation.'32
In his concurring argument, Judge Gajarsa sharply criticized
Congress for including the limitation provisions in both the ISDA
and in the 1994 appropriation. 33 Judge Gajarsa agreed with the
Oglala Sioux that the support cost "cap" in the 1994 Appropria-
tions Act contradicted the express purpose of the ISDA, thus di-
minishing the effectiveness of tribal self-determination con-
tracts."34 Finally, Judge Gajarsa suggested other Indian tribes,
seeking full payment of their promised contract support costs,
might consider the breach of contract theory which had proved
successful for the thrift-plaintiffs in Winstar.'35
The Government's argument in Cherokee Nation that tribal con-
tractors were not protected by the Contracts Dispute Act because
of their "special" status is unfortunately reminiscent of many pre-
vious legal decisions predicated on the assumption that Native
Americans lacked the same rights as the non-Indian majority.
Law, more than any other social tool, has contributed to the sub-
ordination of Native Americans.'36 From the Marshall Court's ap-
plication of the Discovery Doctrine to Indian land'37 to Congress'
stripping away of any remaining Indian sovereignty in 187113 to
132. Oglala Sioux, 194 F.3d at 1379.
133. Id. at 1382-83 (Gajarsa, J., concurring). Judge Gajarsa stated:
Although we as a court do not legislate but only interpret the laws that are en-
acted by the legislature, we cannot, and should not, stand idle without calling
attention to the travesty that has been perpetrated in these cases.... The ef-
fect [of the legislation] is to leave the Native American tribes without recourse
to recover the expenses that they had already incurred by performing BIA
functions in reliance on the OIG negotiations.
Id.
134. Id. at 1382.
135. Id. at 1384. This theory was indeed successful in Cherokee Nation, 543 U.S. 631
(2005).
136. William Bradford, With a Very Great Blame on Our Hearts: Reparations, Recon-
ciliation, and an American Indian Plea for Peace with Justice, 27 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 1, 3
(2002/2003) (citing Robert A. Williams, Jr., Columbus's Legacy: Law as an Instrument of
Racial Discrimination Against Indigenous People's Rights of Self-Determination, 8 ARIZ. J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 51 (1991)).
137. Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 584 (1823) (applying the rule of discovery to the
lands of North America and holding that "[t]he United States, or the several States, had
clear title to all the lands [in North American previously claimed by Great Britain], subject
only to the Indian right of occupancy, and the exclusive power to extinguish that right was
vested in [the] government.").
138. 25 U.S.C. § 71 (2005). "No Indian nation or tribe within the territory of the United
States shall be acknowledged or recognized as an independent nation, tribe, or power with
whom the United States may contract by treaty." Id.
415
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the imposition of non-Indian constitutional templates with the
passage of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934,139 the history of
United States-Tribal relations is replete with examples of legal
harm to Native Americans.
While a detailed review of Native American jurisprudential his-
tory is clearly beyond the scope of this note, this history forms the
context for Cherokee Nation. In recent decades, the federal gov-
ernment has begun some attempts at repairing the damage to
tribal sovereignty. 4 ' In 1942, in Seminole Nation v. United
States,141 the United States Supreme Court noted that the federal
government had a responsibility of special trust in relation to Na-
tive Americans. 4 1 In passing the ISDA, Congress prefaced the Act
by a recognition of the federal government's responsibility to indi-
vidual Indian tribes and of the importance of allowing those tribes
to determine and provide their own services."4 When Congress
realized that providing those services was more expensive for the
tribes than the government, Congress amended the ISDA to ex-
pressly provide for reimbursement of those additional costs.'"
Unfortunately, as more tribes opted to provide their own ser-
vices under the terms of the ISDA, Congress' regular increases to
the annual appropriation were not sufficient to keep pace with the
increase in allowable contract support costs, which tripled from
139. Bradford, supra note 136, at 50. See also JUSTIN B. RICHLAND & SARAH DEER,
INTRODUCTION TO TRIBAL LEGAL STUDIES 66 (2004) (quoting VINE DELORIA, JR. &
CLIFFORD M. LYTLE, AMERICAN INDIANS, AMERICAN JUSTICE 99-103 (1983)). Deloria and
Lytle suggest that the 1934 Indian Reorganization Acts severely damaged the traditional
structures of tribal government.
The political damage that had been inflicted upon tribal governments for so
many decades in the past could not be undone overnight. .. . The format that
emerged under the 1934 Act was almost a carbon copy of the structured, legal-
istic European form of government.... [The] Bureau of Indian Affairs . . .
drafted a model constitution that could be used by the tribes [which] in most
cases became the final product.
RICHLAND AND DEER, supra, at 66.
140. Whether the Government has succeeded or not is another issue beyond the scope of
this note.
141. 316 U.S. 286, (1942).
142. Seminole Nation, 316 U.S. at 296-97. The United States Supreme Court recognized
that
[i]n carrying out its treaty obligations with Indian Tribes, the Government is
something more than a mere contracting party ... it has charged itself with
moral obligations of the highest responsibility and trust. Its conduct as dis-
closed in the acts of those who represent it in dealings with the Indians, should
therefore be judged by the most exacting fiduciary standards.
Id.
143. 25 U.S.C. § 450a(b) (2005).
144. 25 U.S.C. § 450j-1(a)(2) (2005).
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1989 through 1998.145 The Government, however, continued to
form ISDA contracts with Indian Tribes, who reasonably expected
the Government to fulfill its promised obligations.
In light of the painful history of United States-Indian relations,
it was reprehensible of the Government to try to shift the risk of a
funding shortfall onto tribes providing basic and necessary medi-
cal services to their people.146 And in light of ISDA's stated pur-
pose, it was somewhat astonishing that the Government would
argue it had the right to withhold a unilaterally determined per-
centage of the lump-sum allotment to support the federal bureauc-
racy.147 If the United States Supreme Court had supported this
position, the decision would have penalized the tribes who elected
for greater self-determination, thus undermining the entire pur-
pose of the ISDA
4
1
Instead, the Supreme Court rightly went straight to the heart of
the matter in Cherokee Nation by focusing on whether the self-
determination contracts were "contracts" in the traditional mean-
ing. The Court refused to allow the Government to yet again place
Native Americans in a "special" category where they had fewer
rights than others, in this case other contractors. By analyzing
the case simply as a breach of contract action, the majority placed
Cherokee Nation squarely in the line of cases stating that even the
federal government must keep its promises or face the legal con-
sequences.
Mary Jensen
145. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INDIAN SELF-DETERMINATION ACT: SHORTFALLS IN
INDIAN CONTRACT SUPPORT COSTS NEED TO BE ADDRESSED, 3 (1999). The costs increased
from about $125 million to about $375 million, resulting in a shortfall of about $95 million
for 1998, the year following those at issue in Cherokee Nation. Id.
146. The Tribes argued that the Government's refusal to fully reimburse them had seri-
ous repercussions in the level of medical care the Tribes were able to provide. "The Secre-
tary's failure to fund the Shoshone-Paiute's Owyhee Hospital contract led to such severe
cutbacks that the Hospital nearly lost its accreditation." Reply Br. for Cherokee Nation
and Shoshone-Paiute Tribes at 5, Cherokee Nation, 543 U.S. 631 (Nos. 02-1472, 03-853).
147. During oral arguments, Justice Souter noted that the Government's argument
allowed the Indian Health Services bureaucracy to "swallow[] the entire budget" by allot-
ting the apportion to either "inherent federal functions" or to agency services to non-
contracting tribes. Tr. of Oral Argument at 49-50, Cherokee Nation, 543 U.S. 631 (2004)
(Nos. 02-1472, 03-853).
148. Those tribes would have to pay their own contract support costs, which would al-
most certainly require a reduction in services. Tribes would be forced to choose either (a)
reduced health care services under a self-determination contract or (b) reduced autonomy
under directly provided services agreement.
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